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Abstract Mental rotation is an important spatial skill.
However, there is controversy concerning its early devel-
opment and susceptibility to intervention. In the present
study, we assessed individual differences in the mental
rotation abilities of children between 3 and 5 years of
age, using a touch screen paradigm to simplify task
demands. A figure or its mirror image was presented in 8
different orientations, and children indicated in which of
two holes the figure would fit by touching one of the holes
on the screen. Task instructions were varied in three con-
ditions, giving the children the opportunity to gather
manual or observational experience with rotations of dif-
ferent stimuli, or giving no additional experience. Chil-
dren’s error rates and response times increased linearly
with increasing angular disparity between the figure and
the hole by the age of 5 years, but 4-year-olds were found
to respond at chance for all angular disparities, despite the
use of a touch screen paradigm. Both manual and obser-
vational experience increased the response accuracy of
5-year-olds, especially for children already performing
well. However, there was no effect on 4-year-olds. Results
point to an emerging readiness to use mental rotation and
profit from observational and manual experience at age 5.
Keywords Mental rotation  Cognitive development 
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Introduction
The ability to represent and reason about objects in space is
a fundamental aspect of everyday cognition. In order to
interact with our environment, we must be able to represent
the positions of objects in our surroundings and recognize
objects from different perspectives. Furthermore, in an
environment full of motion and transformation, we also
must be able to adjust our mental representations in order
to maintain an accurate model of the ever-changing world
around us. Dynamic and flexible representations aid us
when making predictions regarding the future conse-
quences of object motion, for instance, when entering a
building through revolving doors, or in order to avoid
collisions when crossing a street.
Much of the previous research on mental spatial trans-
formation skills has focused on a specific kind of transfor-
mation, namely mental rotation. Mental rotation is the
imagined movement of an object (or array of objects) in 2-
or 3-dimensional space. Mental rotation has been thor-
oughly investigated in adults beginning in the early 1970s
(Cooper and Shepard 1973; Shepard and Metzler 1971).
Studies with children younger than 6 years have been less
common and have yielded diverging indications of when
this ability emerges and what factors influence perfor-
mance. In particular, research using looking time paradigms
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has demonstrated a sensitivity to correspondences between
rotated figures in infants as young as 4–6 months (Hespos
and Rochat 1997; Mo¨hring and Frick (in press); Moore and
Johnson 2008; Quinn and Liben 2008; Rochat and Hespos
1996), but studies using paradigms more similar to the ones
used with adult participants have found that children are
only able to perform mental rotations at the age of 4–5 years
and then at a slower speed than adults (e.g., Kosslyn Mar-
golis et al. 1990; Marmor 1975, 1977). In fact, a follow-up
study that employed the same procedure as Marmor with
different stimuli found even later success: 4- to 6-year-olds
performed near chance level (Dean and Harvey 1979), and
analyses of individual children’s response time patterns
(Estes 1998) suggested that only a small proportion of
4-year-olds appeared to apply a mental rotation strategy.
These findings indicate that there are important individual
differences in mental rotation abilities in preschoolers.
Furthermore, it appears that even though some very simple
ability to anticipate outcomes of rotational movements may
be present in infancy, preschoolers still struggle with mental
rotation tasks.
Sex differences are frequently reported in studies on
adults’ spatial abilities (for meta-analyses, see Linn and
Petersen 1985; Voyer et al. 1995—but see Terlecki and
Newcombe 2005, for evidence that some of these gender
differences in mental rotation might be mediated by dif-
ferences in computer experience). However, reports of sex
differences in young children are inconsistent. Linn and
Petersen’s meta-analysis did not include children younger
than 10 years of age, and three of the four studies listed by
Voyer et al. with children below the age of 10 found no
significant effects of sex on mental rotation (Caldwell and
Hall 1970; Jahoda 1979; Kaess 1971). Among more recent
studies with young children aged 4 years and older that
were not covered by these meta-analyses, some found no
sex differences (Estes 1998; Frick et al. 2009a; Kosslyn
et al. 1990; Platt and Cohen 1981), whereas others found
higher error rates in boys (Kru¨ger and Krist 2009), or sex
differences in older but not in younger children (i.e.,
younger than 4.5 years of age, Levine et al. 1999).
Aside from the question of the early origins and indi-
vidual differences in mental rotation abilities, research on
whether mental rotation skills are susceptible to interven-
tion or instruction has yielded inconsistent results. Marmor
(1977) investigated whether training 4- and 5-year-olds to
use a mental rotation strategy would affect their mental
rotation performance. She administered seven training tri-
als in an instruction phase prior to the mental rotation test,
in which children saw two unaligned stimuli (bears or
cones) and were asked whether they were the same or
different. On the first training trial, children watched the
experimenter rotate the stimulus to an upright position; on
the next three trials, children were allowed to rotate the
stimulus to upright themselves; and on the last three trials,
children were asked to rotate the stimulus ‘‘in their mind’’
without using their hands. In a control condition, children
received seven feedback trials, in which they were told
whether their responses were correct, without rotating the
stimuli to upright. Results showed no significant effect of
training, from which Marmor concluded that 4- and 5-year-
olds are able to spontaneously use and evoke mental
rotations.
In contrast, a subsequent replication study (Platt and
Cohen 1981) showed significant training effects in 5-year-
olds, using essentially the same training procedure as
Marmor’s (1977), with the exception that red mittens were
added to the bear’s paws and children in the control group
went directly to the test trials without receiving any feed-
back. Additionally, Platt and Cohen did not exclude any
participants, whereas in Marmor’s studies, a substantial
number of children were excluded from analyses due to
failure to comply or pass test criteria in a pretraining phase
(23 % of 4-year-olds in Marmor 1977; 23 % of 5-year-olds
in Marmor 1975). These facts may be important, as pre-
training procedures and highly selective inclusion criteria
at the onset of the experiment could contribute to a skewed
picture of individual differences and the trainability of
children’s mental rotation skills at this age.
Platt and Cohen’s (1981) study left the question unan-
swered of whether the training effects were stimulus spe-
cific or whether the experience would generalize to stimuli
other than the trained cones and bears. Another open
question was which aspects of the training procedure
affected performance most, that is, whether observing the
rotation of the stimuli and receiving visual feedback or
whether manually rotating the stimuli was crucial to
improvement. Early theories of cognitive development
underscored the importance of sensorimotor or action-
based knowledge (e.g., Bruner et al. 1966; Gibson and Pick
2000; Kosslyn 1978, 1980; Piaget 1952/1936; Piaget and
Inhelder 1956/1948, 1971/1966). Piaget and Inhelder pro-
posed that cognitive abilities emerge from sensorimotor
experience, such that self-movement is the source of the
most basic knowledge. In their account, mental represen-
tations may be characterized as symbolic imitations of
previously executed actions. Based on these theories, it
would be reasonable to believe that manual rotation was
the crucial aspect of Platt and Cohen’s training.
Indeed, previous research supports the notion that
mental transformations in young children may be affected
by motor activity (Black and Schwartz 1996; Frick et al.
2009a, b), motor constraints (Funk et al. 2005; Kru¨ger and
Krist 2009), and even gesturing (Ehrlich et al. 2006).
Moreover, in a recent study, Mo¨hring and Frick (in press)
found that 6-month-old infants who were given the
opportunity to gather hands-on experience with a test
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object were more apt to detect violations to rotational
events in a subsequent mental rotation task than infants
who only had observational experience. In a follow-up
study, Frick and Mo¨hring (2012) found that by the age of
10 months, prior observational experience sufficed for
infants to detect the violation, suggesting that they became
increasingly able to learn from observational experience
with increasing age. Interestingly, this development
appeared to be related to by infants’ motor development.
The main objective of the present study was to further
investigate the role of visual and manual feedback in task
instruction at the preschool age. Similar to Marmor (1977)
and Platt and Cohen (1981), we provided children with
training trials, in which children watched the experimenter
rotate the stimulus to an upright position or were allowed to
manually rotate the stimuli to upright themselves. How-
ever, in contrast to the original studies, these instructions
were administered to different groups of children, in order
to investigate the relative effects of visual and manual
feedback on children’s mental rotation performance. A
third group did not receive either of these instructions, to
serve as a baseline for children’s spontaneous ability to use
mental rotation. In the present study, children were not
excluded on the basis of pretest performance; instead, all
children proceeded to the mental rotation test, in order to
obtain a more complete picture of the effects of visual and
manual information on all children’s mental rotation abil-
ity. In contrast to previous work, a different set of stimuli
was used for the instruction trials, and surface features of
the task were slightly altered. This procedure allowed us to
investigate whether manual or observational experience
would generalize to a different task with different stimuli.
In the present study, we tested children between 3 and
5 years, at an age range that covered the lower margin of
previous studies (i.e., 4-year-olds: Estes, 1998; Kosslyn
et al. 1990; Marmor 1977; Platt and Cohen 1981), and also
included children who were half a year younger. In con-
sideration of the very young age of our participants, sim-
plified two-dimensional Shepard–Metzler-like figures were
presented, which consisted of two orthogonal segments of
differing lengths, rather than the original four segments
(Shepard and Metzler 1971). These figures were presented
in different orientations on a touch screen, and the task was
to indicate in which of two holes each figure would fit.
Thus, unlike many previous studies of mental rotation, the
present procedure did not require the conveyance of the
complex notions of ‘‘congruency,’’ ‘‘mirror image’’, or
what constitutes a ‘‘different’’ figure, which simplified task
instructions. A similar figure–hole paradigm has been
successfully used in previous research, which demonstrated
mental rotation abilities in 5-year-olds (Frick et al. 2009a).
Furthermore, the ability to fit objects into apertures has
been shown to be well established by the age of 3 (Shutts
et al. 2009). To further simplify the task, children gave
their responses by directly touching one of the holes on a
touch screen. In contrast to previous work with older
children and adults, this direct response measure did not
require remembering any buttons for same-or-different
responses, and thus, the cognitive demands associated with
executing the behavioral response were low.
Method
Participants
Participants were 48 children between 3 and 4 years
(M = 4;0, SD = 3.2 months, range 3;6–4;5) and 48 chil-
dren between 4 and 5 years (M = 5;0,
SD = 3.4 months, range 4;6–5;6). For the sake of read-
ability, these groups will be referred to as 4-year-olds and
5-year-olds, respectively. Within age group and sex, chil-
dren were randomly assigned to one of three instruction
conditions: no experience, manual experience, or obser-
vation. Ages were virtually identical (M = 4;6) across
groups. Six additional children were tested but excluded
from analyses due to either failure to comply with task
instructions (one 4-year-old), perseverative response
behavior (three 4-year-olds made all or all but one
responses to one side), or incomplete data due to technical
difficulties (two children). The sample was predominantly
white, middle class, and was recruited from suburban areas
of a large US city. All children spoke English and were
tested in English.
Stimulus material
Stimuli in the instruction phase consisted of cutouts of
black presentation board that were covered on one side
with a light blue foam sheet. Each cutout piece fit into a
hole in a ground piece of the same color (14.5 by 5.5 cm)
when turned appropriately. Three of the cutouts were
symmetrical (rectangle, half-circle, and equilateral trian-
gle), and two pieces were asymmetrical (see Fig. 1 for
selected examples). For the asymmetrical pieces, there also
were mirror images of both the figure and the ground
components. All of these stimuli differed in shape and
color from the stimuli used in the main experiment.
Stimuli in the main experiment were presented using the
program Cedrus SuperLab 4 and displayed on a 1700 touch
screen monitor (Elo TouchSystems 1739l). At the begin-
ning of each trial, a blue ‘‘fingerprint’’ appeared centered
on the lower edge of a dark gray (RGB color: 62/62/62)
screen. Upon pressing the fingerprint, an orange (RGB
color: 250/200/0) L-shaped figure (or its mirror image) was
presented in the middle of the upper half of the screen (see
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Fig. 2). The figure measured 4.8 cm by 8.0 cm, and the
arm and stem of the ‘‘L’’ were 2.4 cm wide. Simulta-
neously, an orange ground (33.5 cm wide and 5.8 cm high)
was presented, which extended along the lower edge of the
screen. It was divided into two equal-sized areas by a thin
vertical line in the same neutral color as the background.
Two presented ‘‘holes’’ were centered on each side of the
ground. One hole had the same size and shape as the
L-shaped figure; the other hole had the same shape and size
as its mirror image. The distance between the lower edge of
the figure and the ground was between 8.0 and 10.2 cm
(depending on the orientation of the figure).
Two response areas were defined that were 10.5 cm
wide and 8 cm high and generously covered the left and
right ‘‘holes.’’ These two response areas were equidistant
from the figure as well as the fingerprint. Responses inside
these areas were coded as either correct or incorrect;
responses outside these areas caused the trial to be repe-
ated. If there was no response within 10 s, the trial was
rerun. Response times were registered as the time in mil-
liseconds between pressing the fingerprint and pressing one
of the response areas.
Procedure
Participants were tested in a laboratory room. As a warm-
up, children were asked to finish a puzzle depicting a
caterpillar that was missing three final pieces. Children
were then told that they would now play a different kind of
puzzle game.
Children in the manual experience condition received 18
training trials with the blue cardboard pieces. The pieces
were presented one at a time on a black surface, in com-
bination with a ground in which they would either fit or not
fit, according to a predetermined order. The first three trials
presented pieces in the same orientations as the holes, thus
a simple translational movement was necessary to fit them
into the holes. Typically, the children rotated the pieces on
the black cardboard surface and hardly ever lifted them, as
the task lent itself to slide the pieces on the black board. In
very rare cases, children lifted a piece and tried to fit in
upside-down during the instruction trials, so they were told
that they were not allowed to flip the piece in this game
because the backside was not of the matching blue color.
Next, five trials were presented for each of three angular
discrepancies between the pieces and the holes: 45, 90 (in
either direction), and 180. These pieces had to be trans-
lated and rotated in order to fit into the holes. Of these 5
trials per angle, one trial showed a symmetrical shape with
the correct hole and one trial showed a piece with the
wrong-shaped hole (e.g., triangular piece with b-shaped
hole). These trials were rather easy and implemented in
order to keep children motivated. Three trials per angle
presented asymmetrical shapes with either matching or
mirror-reversed holes. At the beginning of every trial,
children were asked to first guess whether the piece would
Fig. 1 Examples of stimuli used in the instruction phase: asymmet-
rical or symmetrical figure and ground pieces
Fig. 2 Examples of stimuli
used in the main experiment:
a 0 trial, L-shaped stimulus,
ground version A; b 135 trial,
mirror image of L-shaped
stimulus, ground version B
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fit into the hole and were then permitted to manually move
the piece and push it into the hole. Note that in contrast to
subsequent test trials, only one hole was presented, and the
child’s task was to decide whether the piece would fit or
not.
In the observation condition, the same trials were pre-
sented, but the children were not permitted to turn the
pieces themselves. After they made their guess as to
whether the piece would fit, the experimenter slowly
rotated the piece and moved it to the hole. Children were
allowed to push the piece in the last 2 mm in order to
maintain engagement in the task. Immediately after the
training, children proceeded to the main experiment and
were told that they would now play the same game on the
computer. In the no experience condition, children directly
proceeded to the main experiment after the warm-up
puzzle.
The main experiment was first introduced and explained
with cardboard stimuli that had the same shape and color as
the stimuli depicted on the touch screen, but were slightly
smaller (88 %, see Fig. 2). Children were asked to help a
small toy figure ‘‘fix his road,’’ so that he would not fall
into the holes in the road when trying to walk across. In
three instruction trials, the experimenter placed a cardboard
piece centered above the two holes and asked the child to
pick the hole in which the piece would fit and to try to fit it
in themselves. The three instruction trials alternated
between the L-shaped figure and its mirror image, and the
figures were placed at roughly 45 or 135 (in either
direction). Children were instructed that they were not
allowed to flip the pieces because the other side was not of
the matching orange color.
After the instruction trials, children were told that they
would next play the same game, but on the computer.
Children started each trial by pressing the blue fingerprint
on the touch screen. A figure and two holes appeared on
the screen, and children were instructed to point to the
hole that they thought the piece would fit if turned the
right way. Children first received 4 practice trials on the
touch screen, after which the smiling or frowning face of
the toy figure provided feedback (in accord with selection
of the correct or incorrect hole), followed by 16 experi-
mental trials without feedback. Prior to the experimental
trials, children were informed that the smiley face would
not show up anymore. After half of the experimental
trials, children were allowed to take a short break, and a
progress bar would show the children how much they had
accomplished and how many holes were left to fill. At the
conclusion of the experiment, the same progress bar with
all the holes filled in was presented along with a smiley
face, indicating that the child had successfully fixed the
road. (This presentation was not contingent upon level of
performance.)
Design
The L-shaped figure and its mirror image were presented in
eight different orientations, from 0 to 315 (clockwise) in
steps of 45, which resulted in 16 different trials. On 0
trials, the pieces were presented in the same orientation as
the hole and only a translational movement was necessary
to mentally match the pieces with the holes. However, with
increasing angular discrepancy between the pieces and the
holes (45 up to 180), a rotational as well as translational
movement was necessary to mentally align the pieces with
holes. Trials were presented in one of four different pre-
defined quasi-random orders, with the restriction that every
angle was presented once in the first and second half,
respectively.
Furthermore, there were two versions of the grounds: in
version A, the L-shaped hole was presented on the left side;
in version B, the L-shaped hole was presented on the right
side. Children were assigned randomly to one of the ver-
sions and orders, with the restriction that there was an
equal number of 4- and 5-year-old boys and girls for each
versions and order in each instruction condition.
Results
Using a touch screen allowed us to record children’s
choices and response times. We first analyzed how many of
the 16 experimental trials each child solved correctly, as an
indicator of their overall performance. We next analyzed
whether error rates and response times increased with
increasing angular distance of the figure to the hole, which
was to be expected if children mentally rotated the figure to
solve the task (cf. Estes 1998). Additionally, we performed
separate analyses using data from children whose overall
performance was relatively strong, to examine whether
inclusion of data from children who responded randomly
might have obscured some effects.
Overall performance (total correct trials)
Figure 3 shows the distribution of performance scores for
the entire sample and for the two age groups separately. All
of the histograms exhibit a dip at the point corresponding to
nine correct responses, which suggests that the sample may
be composed of two separate groups: one group of children
who responded at chance level (obtaining about 8 out of 16
correct responses) and a group who responded better.
According to the binomial distribution, more than 11 trials
correct out of 16 trials with two choice alternatives would
be considered as above chance level (with p \ .05). Given
the dip in the histograms at 9 correct choices, and to
minimize a beta-error of missing children who were not
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guessing, a slightly more lenient cutoff point of more than
10 correct choices was used to define good performance
(binomial p = .105). According to this criterion, out of the
total 96 participants, 35 children (36 %) were classified as
good performers. Among these, 13 children (27 %) were
4-year-olds and 22 children (46 %) were 5-year-olds, v2(1,
N = 96) = 3.64, p = .056.
There was a significant relationship between overall
performance and accuracy on the two 0 trials, which
required translation but no mental rotation, v2(1,
N = 96) = 27.6, p \ .001. Out of 96 children, 74 (=77 %;
75 % of 4-year-olds and 79 % of 5-year-olds) showed
consistent results, in that they either were classified as good
performers and solved both 0 trials correctly (29 %) or
performed at chance and erred on at least one of the 0
trials (48 %). Only 6 children (6 %) performed well overall
but solved one of the 0 trials incorrectly, and one child
made two errors. Finally, there were 15 children (16 %)
who solved both 0 trials correctly but still showed chance
performance.
Error rates
In order to investigate whether error rates (ER) rose with
increasing amount of rotation needed to fit the figure into a
hole, errors for trials with equal angular disparity (but
opposite direction of rotation) were averaged. Specifically,
responses for 45 angles were averaged with responses for
315 angles, 90with 270, and 135with 225. This resulted
in a new variable we shall refer to as ‘‘disparity,’’ with five
levels (0, 45, 90, 135, and 180 angular distance to the
hole). Furthermore, errors for trials that presented L-shaped
figures and their mirror images were collapsed.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with dis-
parity (5) as a within-subject variable, age group (2),
instruction condition (3), and sex (2) as between-subjects
variables, and mean ER as the dependent variable. This
analysis showed a significant main effect of disparity, F(4,
336) = 2.41, p \ .05, g2 = 0.03, with a significant linear
component, F(1, 84) = 5.71, p \ .05, g2 = 0.06. Further-
more, the analysis showed a significant effect of age group,
F(1, 84) = 10.55, p \ .01, g2 = 0.11, with 4-year-olds on
average solving fewer trials correctly (M = 8.6, SD = 2.4)
than 5-year-olds (M = 10.6, SD = 3.3), a significant inter-
action of age group and sex, F(1, 84) = 5.12, p \ .05,
g2 = 0.06, and a tendency to an interaction of age group and
disparity, F(4, 336) = 2.24, p = .065, g2 = 0.03. All other
effects were non-significant, all ps [ .15, all g2 \ 0.05.
To further investigate the above interactions, separate
ANOVAs for each age group were calculated (otherwise
analogous to the above). These analyses showed that dis-
parity had a significant, F(4, 168) = 5.62, p \ .001,
g2 = 0.12, and linear, F(1, 42) = 14.38, p \ .001,
g2 = 0.26, effect in 5-year-olds, but not in 4-year-olds,
F \ 1. Figure 4a illustrates that 4-year-olds responded
roughly at chance (50 % correct) for all disparities, whereas
5-year-olds’ error rates increased with angular disparity
between the figure and the holes. In 5-year-olds, males
(M = 11.7, SD = 3.4) performed better than females
(M = 9.4, SD = 2.9), F(1, 42) = 7.36, p \ .05, g2 = 0.15,
but there was no difference between males (M = 8.6,
SD = 2.3) and females (M = 8.6, SD = 2.6) in 4-year-olds,
F \ 1. The interaction between instruction condition and
disparity approached significance in 5-year-olds, F(8,
168) = 1.94, p = .058, g2 = 0.08, but not in 4-year-olds,
F \ 1.
Fig. 3 a Histogram showing the total number of children for each performance score (correct trials out of 16), and b separate histograms for
each age group
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Response times
Response times were analyzed using only correct respon-
ses. Furthermore, 6 outliers of response times faster than
500 ms (2 incorrect and 4 correct) were discarded. Similar
to error rates, response times were pooled across trials with
angles of equal disparity between figures and holes and
across L-shaped figures and their mirror images.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with
disparity (5) as within-subject variable, age group (2),
instruction condition (3), and sex (2) as between-subjects
variables, and mean RT as dependent variable. This anal-
ysis yielded a significant interaction of age group and
disparity, F(4, 192) = 2.77, p \ .05, g2 = 0.06. Figure 4b
illustrates that 5-year-olds’ but not 4-year-olds’ response
times showed an overall positive relationship with dispar-
ity, similar to the results for error rates above. All other
effects and interactions were non-significant, all ps [ .10,
all g2 \ 0.06. Again, separate ANOVAs for each age group
(otherwise analogous to the above) confirmed that disparity
had a significant, F(4, 104) = 4.47, p \ . 01, g2 = 0.15,
and linear, F(1, 26) = 11.15, p \ .01, g2 = 0.30, effect in
5-year-olds, but not in 4-year-olds, F \ 1.
Effects of experience
The above analyses hinted at effects of instruction condi-
tion on 5-year-olds’ error rates. However, the inclusion of
children who respond near chance level may have obscured
effects by contributing a large amount of error variance.
Furthermore, previous studies often found that only chil-
dren with some cognitive readiness (e.g., as revealed in
gestures, see Church and Goldin-Meadow 1986; Perry et al.
1988) profited from training. Therefore, in the following
analyses, good performers and near chance performers
were considered separately.
Separate ANOVAs with disparity (5) as within-subject
variable, instruction condition (3) and sex (2) as between-
subjects variables, and ER as dependent variable showed
that effects of instruction condition were statistically sig-
nificant for good performers, F(2, 16) = 5.09, p \ .05,
g2 = 0.39. Post hoc comparisons (Hochberg’s GT2) indi-
cated that good performers made fewer errors with manual
experience than without any experience (mean differ-
ence = 16 %, p \ .05) and fewer errors with observational
experience than without any experience (mean differ-
ence = 17 %, p \ .05). The difference between manual
and observational experience was non-significant (mean
difference = 0.6 %, p = .99, see Fig. 5). This group also
showed a significant linear increase in ER with increasing
disparity, F(4, 64) = 4.34, p \ .01, g2 = 0.21; lin. F(1,
16) = 7.48, p \ .05, g2 = 0.32. All other effects were non-
significant, all ps [ .59, all g2 \ 0.10. Near chance per-
formers, on the other hand, exhibited no significant effect
of instruction condition, F [ 1, or disparity, F(4,
80) = 1.55, p = .20, g2 = 0.07. A trend for an interaction
between instruction condition and disparity, F(8,
80) = 1.98, p = .059, g2 = 0.17, was largely due to a very
high error rate at 180 without experience. All other effects
were non-significant, all ps [ .15, all g2 \ 0.08.1
Similar analyses with RT as dependent variable showed
a significant linear effect of disparity in good performers,
F(4, 56) = 5.03, p \ .01, g2 = 0.26; lin. F(1, 14) = 10.38,
p \ .01, g2 = 0.43.2 No main effects of instruction con-
dition or interactions of instruction condition with disparity
were found (F \ 1).
Discussion
In the present study, the mental rotation abilities of 4- to
5-year-olds were assessed using a touch screen paradigm.









































Fig. 4 a Mean error rates, and b mean response times for correct trials only by angle of disparity, for the two age groups
1 Analyses for 4-year-old good performers showed no effects of
disparity, F(4, 32) = 1.31, p = .29, g2 = 0.14, and no main effect of
or interaction with instruction condition (F \ 1).
2 There was no such effect in 4-year-old good performers (F \ 1).
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abilities between the ages of four and five. Five-year-olds
on average solved more trials correctly than 4-year-olds,
and analyses of children’s responses as a function of
angular disparity from the figure to the hole also suggested
developmental progression between 4 and 5 years of age.
Whereas 5-year-olds’ error rates and response times
increased linearly with increasing angular disparity
between the figure and the hole, 4-year-olds responded
roughly at chance and at the same speed for all disparities.
Linearly increasing response patterns are generally accep-
ted as being indicative of mental rotation and have been
shown to be strongly associated with reports of the sub-
jective experience of using mental rotation strategies in
adults (e.g., Shepard and Cooper 1982) and in 4- to 6-year-
old children (Estes 1998). Thus, the linearly increasing
response time and error patterns of the group of 5-year-olds
suggest that they used a mental rotation strategy, in general
making more errors and taking longer amounts of time to
rotate the stimuli at greater degrees of rotation. In contrast,
the flat graphs of the 4-year-olds suggest that they either
did not apply mental rotation or tried but failed to do so.
The finding that the majority of 4-year-olds performed
near chance level in this mental rotation task is consistent
with previous reports by Estes (1998) that only a quarter of
4-year-olds reached a rotator criterion based on a signifi-
cant linear trend in response times. Furthermore, Estes
found that at a mean age of 56 and 66 months, children
responded correctly on 60 and 74 % of the trials, respec-
tively. Children in the present study were about half a year
younger with a mean age of 48 and 60 months, solved 8.6
(54 %) and 10.6 (66 %) out of 16 trials correctly. Taken
together, results of these two studies suggest a progressive
increase in accuracy (54, 60, 66, and 74 % correct trials)
with increasing age (48, 56, 60, and 66 months). Given that
the paradigms used by Estes and the present study are quite
different from one another, it is even more remarkable that
this increase in accuracy with increasing age was found to
be so regular. This congruency of results speaks to the
validity of this new measure.
A fairly large proportion of children erred on at least one
of the 0 trials. One potential explanation for this result is
that children had difficulties with matching a figure to a
hole or, in other words, comparing the shape of positive
and negative spaces. However, this interpretation seems
unlikely in light of previous findings that by 30 months of
age, the ability to fit objects into holes is fairly well
established (Shutts et al. 2009). A more likely explanation
rests on the fact that on 0 trials, although the piece did not
have to be rotated, it still had to be mentally moved (for
example, in a diagonal translation) to be matched with the
hole. A previous study that compared rotational and
translational mental transformations in 4- to 6-year-olds
(Levine et al. 1999) showed that even though translational
items were solved significantly more often than rotational
items, scores on translational items were far from perfect
(on average, 4.41 and 4.66 out of 8 items correct for hor-
izontal and diagonal translations, respectively). Consistent
with our results, 5-year-olds performed significantly better
than 4-year-olds, providing convergent evidence that there
is considerable progression in rotational as well as trans-
lational mental transformation abilities during this devel-
opmental time period.
Another task demand that deserves consideration and
could account for young children’s problems with mental
rotation tasks involves the presentation of mirror images.
Presenting mirror images is a preferred means to prevent
participants from using feature strategies (as already sug-
gested by Shepard and Metzler 1971), yet the confusion of
Fig. 5 Error rates by
instruction condition for good
performers and near chance
performers in each age group
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mirror images has been discussed as the source of school
children’s difficulties distinguishing between the letters b,
d, p, and q (e.g., Davidson 1935). On the other hand,
mental rotation studies showing that already infants can
distinguish between mirror images presented in different
orientations [e.g., Mo¨hring and Frick (in press); Moore and
Johnson 2008, Quinn and Liben 2008] suggest that the
foundation for this ability is in place early on. Moreover,
Wohlwill and Wiener (1964) reported a high level of
proficiency in 4-year-olds’ differentiation of up–down and
left–right mirror reversals. Caldwell and Hall (1969) came
to the conclusion that mirror confusions are most likely due
to children’s (task-)inappropriate concept of ‘‘same’’ and
‘‘different’’ rather than perceptual abilities. The present
study tried to avoid this problem by not asking for same-or-
different responses, but to ask children which piece would
fit into a hole. Nevertheless, on the basis of the present
results, it cannot be ruled out that cognitive limitations in
differentiating mirror images may in part account for
individual differences in mental rotation.
In order to shed light on which factors may determine
children’s mental rotation performance, we compared three
different instruction conditions, which gave children the
opportunity to manually turn or observe an experimenter
turn different stimuli or no such experience. Results
showed that the group of 4-year-olds was not affected by
either form of experience, suggesting that they were not
cognitively ready to profit from the additional manual and
visual information. In contrast, 5-year-olds showed a ten-
dency to profit from experience, and in an analysis that
focused on children who performed well, the instruction
condition was found to have a significant effect on error
rates. This result is in line with findings from previous
training studies indicating that only children with some
cognitive readiness (e.g., as revealed in gestures, see
Church and Goldin-Meadow 1986; Perry et al. 1988)
benefit from training.
Post hoc tests indicated that manual and observational
experience had a similar positive effect, as compared to the
baseline condition without additional instruction. Since the
stimuli used in the instruction phase were different from
the ones used in the later experimental trials, increased
familiarity with the stimuli cannot account for these
effects. Furthermore, because surface features of the task
were different, effects cannot simply be explained by
increased familiarity with the basic task format. More
likely, children benefitted from observing the rotational
movement and manipulating the pieces and were able to
transfer this knowledge to the subsequent mental rotation
task.
Based upon the above-mentioned reports of positive
effects of motor activity in children [e.g., Ehrlich et al.
2006; Frick et al. 2009a] and infants [Frick and Wang (in
press); Mo¨hring and Frick (in press)], we might have
expected active manual experience to have a greater impact
on performance than observational experience alone.
However, there is recent evidence that effects of observa-
tional experience increase with age and infants’ own motor
abilities (Frick and Mo¨hring 2012). Thus, by 5 years of
age, our children may have been old enough to learn from
observational experience. Furthermore, task differences
may explain differences to the above studies that found
superior performance after active movement in children. In
Ehrlich and colleagues’ study, children were gesturing or
observing gestures, and in Frick et al.’s study, the move-
ment was remote controlled. Thus, direct interaction of an
observed human model with the stimulus may be a pre-
condition for successful learning through observation.
Given the applied value of such interventions for educa-
tion, future research should further investigate which fac-
tors promote observational learning and which are
necessary preconditions if young children are to profit from
observational experience.
In line with previous reports of sex differences in older
participants (for a meta-analysis, see Linn and Petersen
1985) and infants (e.g., Moore and Johnson 2008; Quinn
and Liben 2008), error rates of 5-year-old boys were lower
than those of girls. However, when children who responded
near chance level were excluded from analyses, 5-year-olds
showed no sex effects, and therefore, these results should
be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, there are several
studies on mental rotation performance in 4- and 5-year-
olds that reported no significant effects involving sex
(Estes 1998; Kosslyn et al. 1990) or only 3- and 5-way
interactions that were not explored any further (Marmor
1975, 1977). Thus, it appears that sex differences are not
robust in 4- to 5-year-olds.
Our results indicate that preschool-age children still
have difficulties with a very simplified mental rotation task
that was designed to put as few demands on working
memory, attention span, and verbal comprehension as
possible. Even with these considerations, only a small
number of 4-year-olds showed good performance. These
results seem to contradict recent findings of early mental
rotation competence in infants (e.g., Moore and Johnson
2008; Quinn and Liben 2008). However, these discrepan-
cies may be due to differences in research paradigms that
are used in studies targeting different age groups. The
manner of stimulus presentation often differs considerably,
and—more importantly—infant studies generally utilize
looking time methods, and thus, the dependent measure
necessarily differs from those practicable with older chil-
dren. Looking time measures may be more sensitive and
detect more subtle cognitive abilities that may be obscured
when children have to make a conscious choice and exe-
cute a motor response. Thus, looking time paradigms may
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detect precursors of mental rotation abilities, such as a
basic understanding of rotation processes and anticipation
of object movement, but these insights may not yet have
behavioral consequences. Previous studies have shown that
it takes several more months for this precursory under-
standing to become behaviorally applicable, so that infants
can successfully rotate objects in order to fit them through
apertures (e.g., O¨rnkloo and von Hofsten 2007). Our results
extend these findings by showing that even by age 5, when
manual dexterity is no longer a limiting factor, there are
still considerable developmental progression and individual
differences in the ability to mentally rotate an object.
More sensitive and age-appropriate methods are needed
to reconcile these divergent findings in different age
groups. The present study took a first step in this direction
by employing a touch screen method that provided an
immediate and direct input method, requiring little expla-
nation and entailing low memory demands. Future research
should aim to find out more about the development of this
spatial ability and the ontogenesis of individual differences.
Recent research has shown that individual differences in
spatial skills are predictive of later careers in STEM dis-
ciplines (Shea et al. 2001; Wai et al. 2009). Therefore, it is
of important practical relevance to learn more about indi-
vidual differences in mental rotation abilities, their origins,
and means to foster this spatial skill at a young age.
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